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ROE V. DOE: CHILD'S RIGHT TO A COLLEGE
EDUCATION V. PARENT'S RIGHT OF CONTROL
Antagonism created by the exercise of parental authority and
adolescent resistance to such authority is not unique to today's parentchild relationships.1 However, whereas in the past such family conflicts
were settled within the family itself, remedies are now sought in legal
actions initiated by independent off-spring2 who insist that they be
absolutely free to live according to their own values, but demand that
parents provide for their support.
In the instant case of Mary Roe v. John Doe,3 the petitioner, a
twenty-year-old female college student, attending school away from
home, decided, after living in a college dormitory, to reside off-campus.
This move was contrary to her father's prior instructions. In addition
to being placed on academic probation by the university, she had also
experimented with drugs, including LSD and marijuana, although it
appeared that she was not an addict. The father, a prominent attorney, upon learning of her off-campus residence, immediately terminated all support and directed that she return home. The daughter
refused to comply with his wishes and, instead, sold her car and lived
off the proceeds.
During the following summer, while she was living with the
parents of a friend, the daughter commenced a support proceeding in
the New York Family Court in which she alleged her father's refusal to
and neglect in providing for her fair and reasonable support. The
family court, in holding for the daughter, issued two separate orders:
a temporary support order requiring that the father pay his daughter's
tuition for the forthcoming semester as well as all reasonable medical
expenses; and a final support order requiring that he pay $250 per
month in support until his daughter reached her twenty-first birthday.
The father refused to comply with the court orders and, as a result,
1 The parable of the "Prodigal Son" leaving home only to return at a later date.

Luke 15:1-32.
2 Prior to 1969, under the holding of Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E.
551 (1928), an interfamily suit based on the commission of a tort was prohibited by the
courts on the assumption that such a suit would create discord in a family.
This prohibition was diluted by the New York Court of Appeals in Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.EY.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), noted in 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rv. 127 (1969). In reversing Sorrentino the Court held that with the advent of insurance
coverage such a suit would aid the cohesiveness of a family by affording the injured member a means of recovering his loss. See also Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66
(1966); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d
402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
3 29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d' 71 (1971).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:139

was ordered committed to prison for thirty days. After he posted a bond
equivalent to the amount due, the commitment order was stayed pending appeal.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, modified the
family court order 4 by directing that the father pay only those university and health bills that had arisen prior to November 30, 1970, the
date of the family court's final order of $250 per month support, and
reversing the final order requiring payment of the $250 per month. The
Court of Appeals affirmed 5 the appellate division decision and held
that when a minor of employable age and in full possession of her
faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent's home,
against the parent's will, for the purpose of avoiding parental control,
all rights to support are forfeited., It also indicated that courts should
be extremely reluctant to become involved in situations of this type,
characterizing the family court's action in these affairs as an unwarranted intrusion based upon standards of decorum established by the
7
Court of Appeals.
Although the issue was novel in New York, the underlying principle that a minor forfeits all rights to support when he places himself
beyond effective control of his parents can easily be traced back to the
common law. Under the common law, a parent's duties to his legitimate
off-spring were to provide for their maintenance, protection and education.8 In Roe the Court of Appeals reaffirmed this premise by viewing a
parent as chargeable with the discipline and support of his off-spring. 9
The Court also pointed out that these parental obligations are not terminated by the delinquent behavior of a minor child, even if such
behavior is unexplained and persistent. 10 However, under the common
law, the courts held that they did not have the power to enforce such
"natural obligations.""
The facts presented in the instant case are unique in American
jurisprudence. In the vast majority of cases in which child support is
ordered, there is present some degree of family discord, such as divorce
4 Roe v. Doe, 36 App. Div. 2d 162, 318 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1st Dep't 1971).
5 Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971).
6Id.at 194, 272 N.E.2d at 571, 324 N.YS.2d at 76. See 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 16
(1950). The responsibility of parents terminates when a minor leaves home voluntarily
or becomes emancipated.
7 Id. at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
8 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 446.
929 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 NXE.2d at 569, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 74 (1971).
10 Id.
11 Wellesley v. iDuke of Beauford, 2 Russ. 3-23 (1827). But see Wellesley v. Wellesley,
4 Eng. Rep. 1080 (1828) where the chancellor felt he had the power to act for the benefit
of the child.
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or separation.1 In the instant case, however, there was no divorce or
separation of the parents; the father had remarried several times after
the death of the daughter's mother.
Courts have generally recognized the duty of a parent to provide
an education for his children. 3 For many years courts have imposed
upon the father the responsibility of furnishing at least a minimum
level of education, such as a grade or common school education.' 4 It

has usually been held when there has been no break-up of the
family unit, it is the father's prerogative to decide the level of edu-

cation he will furnish for his children and if he has decided that a
college education is either unnecessary or an undue strain upon the
family's finances, the courts have not interfered. 5 This precedent was
followed to a certain extent in the instant case when the Court declared
that it was the parent's natural right as well as his legal duty to control,
to care for and to protect his minor children without judicial interference - absent evidence of the parent's misfeasance, neglect or arbitrariness.'
On the other hand, the courts have involved themselves with the
question of the extent of a minor's education where there is evidence

of family disharmony. In such cases, courts will generally require a
parent to pay for a college education only when there has been either a
separation or divorce and the minor no longer is in the father's legal
custody.17 In these situations, decisions have been based on the ground
12 See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1, 430 S.W.2d 864 (1968); Maitzen v.
Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d
748 (1948); Barry v. Barry, 291 Mich. 666, 289 N.W. 397 (1932); O'Brien v. Springer, 202
Misc. 210, 107 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1951). Contra, Blau v. Blau, 199 Pa.
Super. 467, 185 A.2d 804 (1962) (wherein the father was ordered to provide support even
though there was no divorce, since he had expressly agreed to support the child).
13 Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850
(1947); Board of Educ. v. Purse, 101 Ga. 422, 28 S.E. 896 (1897); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind.
324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901) (parent convicted of violation of state statute in not sending his
child to school); Division of Pub. Assistance v. Mills, 391 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965);
Santasiero v. Briggs, 278 App. Div. 15, 103 N.Y.S.2d I (3d Dep't 1951); Crawford v. District
School Bd., 68 Ore. 388, 137 P.217 (1913) (father is charged by law with the duty of support
and education of his children); Gully v. Gully, 111 Tex. 233, 231 S.W. 97 (1921). See also 67
CJ.S. Parent and Child § 15 (1950) discussing the duty and liability of a parent as to
support and education.
'4 Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844). See generally 1 J. ScHouLrx,
MARRIAGE, DIvoRCa, SEPARATION, AND DOME.STC RELATIoNs ch. 9 § 774 (Duty of Education) (6th ed. 1921).
15 Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P.264 (1926).
Whenever a father has the custody of a child, the law presumes that he will
provide for the child's education in the vocation for which it is best fitted and
which will enable it to meet the conditions of modem life.
Id. at 184, 244 P. at 267.
16 29 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324 N.YS.2d at 75.
17 Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 11. App.2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Jackman v. Short, 165
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that the father may no longer be in a position to realize the educational
requirements of his child, as well as the possibility that he might be
less motivated by natural affection to provide a college education.' 8
However, the courts are not unanimous in finding a college education to be necessary, even where the parents are divorced or separated. 19
Some courts feel that a proper education is a "necessity" but will impose only a requirement of a grade-school education.20 In the majority
of cases, nevertheless, judges have gone further and presumed that support will be provided by the father during the entire period of high
school unless the father clearly establishes that he is unable to furnish
this additional expense. 21 Other courts have even expanded the requirement of support during high school and held that although a father is
generally under no duty to provide a college education, he may be
required to do so under certain circumstances.2 2 Finally, some tribunals
have held that a father is chargeable with providing that level of edu23
cation which is consistent with his financial ability.

Once a court has decided that a minor child is entitled to support
until he completes his college education, there are two approaches used
to enforce the father's support obligation. Either, the common-law
definition of "necessary" 24 is expanded, or the courts utilize the powers
Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941). See generally Bosley, Child Support-Protecting the Child's
Interest, 4 FAMILY L. Q. 230 (1970).
18 138 Wash. at 176, 244 P. at 267 (1926).
19 Halsted v. Halsted, 288 App. Div. 298, 299, 239 N.Y.S. 422, 424 (2d Dep't 1930).
"Unlike the furnishing of a common school education to an infant, the furnishing of a
classical or professional education by a parent to a child is not a 'necessary."'
20 Sisson v. Schultz, 251 Mich. 553, 232 N.W. 253 (1930).
21 See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1, 430 S.W.2d 864 (1968); ci. Golay v.
Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 210 P.2d 1022 (1949). See Inker & McGrath, College Education of
Minors, 6 J. FAMILY L.Q. 230 (1966) (discussing the divorced father's emerging legal obligations).
22
Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968), wherein the court
applied the Indiana Annotated Statutes (1968). See IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-1219 (1968):
The court may require the father to provide all or some specified part of the
cost of education of such child or children beyond the twelfth year of education
provided by the public schools, taking into consideration the earnings of the
father.
23 Weingast v. Weingast, 44 Misc. 2d 952, 255 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Fam.Ct. Nassau County
1964). (Petitioner sought to obtain additional money to defray the expense of the child's
college education. Today with a college education being a necessity the court looked at
the father's financial ability and ordered him to pay the child's expenses.) See H. FosTRm &
D. FREED, LAW AND TME FAMmY (New York) Ch. 23 (Child Support) (1966) [hereinafter
Fosm & Ftm].
24 See, e.g., 138 Wash. at 182, 244 P. at 267. "Where the college graduate of that day
was the exception, today such a person may almost be said to be the rule." Calogeras v.
Calogeras, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. 1959) (awards for a college
education made in behalf of a child displaying sufficient capacity are within the contemplation of the common-law rule); Atchley v. Atchley, 29 Tenn. App. 124, 194 S.W.2d 252
(1946); Feek v. Feek, 187 Wash. 578, 60 P.2d 686 (1936).
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granted to them under various divorce statutes to compel child sup25
port.
Those courts which do not require support until a minor completes his college education generally rely upon a narrow interpretation
of the term "necessary" to mean only those items which are dire necessities. 26 Courts which do require support during college years generally
take the approach that a college education is "necessary" today in order
to properly raise a child in our modem technological society; for it is
believed that in order to advance in life, higher levels of education are
27
now demanded.
In addition to finding some degree of rupture in the family relationship, certain other factors must also be present before a parent is
required to provide a college education. First, the child must be a
minor; 28 second, he must be unemancipated; 29 third, the child must
be in the legal custody of a third party; 30 fourth, the father must be
financially able to furnish a college education; and fifth, the child
should be able to successfully undertake a college-level education.3 1
25 The common-law rule as to the liabiiy of a father for necessaries has been
supplanted by statutory provisions. See Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941).
See also Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Hale v.
Hale, 55 Cal. App. 2d 879, 132 P.2d 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Luques v. Luques, 127 Me.
356, 143 A. 263 (1928); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956); Pass v.
Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Stoner v. Weiss, 96 Okla. 285, 222 P. 547 (1924);
Peck v. Peck, 272 Wis. 466, 76 N.W.2d 316 (1956).
26"[1]t has been declared to be the law ... that a college education is not included
among the necessaries which a parent is legally required to furnish." Ford v. Ford, 109
Ohio App. 495, 496, 167 N.E2d 787, 788 (1959) (court granted support but did not state
that it was for college expenses). Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386 (1931);
Strayer v. Strayer, 26 N.J. Misc. 218, 59 A.2d 39 (Ch. 1948); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 58 NJ.
Eq. 570, 43 A. 904 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899).
27 See Calogeras v. Calogeras, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. 1959) (court
discusses competition with the Russians for ideological supremacy). See also Payette v.
Payette, 85 N.H. 297, 157 A. 531 (1931); Feek v. Feek, 187 Wash. 573, 60 P.2d 686 (1936);
Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926). See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1207
(1957).
28 Genda v. Superior Ct., 103 Ariz. 240, 439 P.2d 811 (1968); Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (1968); Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 241 N.E.2d 50 (1968);
Davis v. Davis, 8 Mich. App. 104, 153 N.W.2d 879 (1967); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J. Super.
26, 69 A.2d 752 (1949) (provides exception if child is crippled); Robrock v. Robrock, 167
Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958); Peck v. Peck, 272 Wis. 466, 76 N.W.2d 316 (1956).
29 See, eg., Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966) (although both
children have left the father's home they continue to reside with the mother). See also
Codornz v. Codornz, 34 Cal. 2d 811, 215 P.2d 32 (1950); Broemmer v. Broemmer, 219
S.W.2d S00 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
30 Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626,
109 P.2d 860 (1941); Feek v. Feek, 187 Wash. 573, 60 P.2d 686 (1936); Esteb v. Esteb, 138
Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926). See also Inker & McGrath, College Education of Minors,
6 FA MILY L.Q. 230 (1966).
31 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 210 A.2d 549 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1965); Pincus v. Pincus, 197
A.2d 854 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1964); Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 In. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840
(1959); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W2d 216 (1956); Pass v. Pass 238 Miss.
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When a legal separation or divorce has occurred, courts generally
assume a paternal attitude. After examining all of the relevant factors
listed above, a judge will decide what the father would have done under
32
the same circumstances and will act accordingly. In Gerk v. Gerk,
the Supreme Court of Iowa expanded the obligation to provide a
college education, where there had been no divorce or legal separation
but only a "de facto" separation. Therein, the mother had deserted
the father and had wrongfully taken custody of the child. The father
was ordered to furnish a college education for his minor child.
In Roe v. Doe, the family court ordered the father to provide
support while the daughter attended college even though the father
had legal custody of the child and there was no separation or divorce,
or similar type of family discord present. 33 Both the appellate division
and the Court of Appeals agreed that the father was not required to
furnish support past the daughter's twenty-first birthday when the
daughter had placed herself beyond effective control of her father.3 4
The chronological sequence of events in the instant case should be
recalled in order to demonstrate that, although the appellate division
and the Court of Appeals held that the daughter forfeited all right to
support, the father was in fact obligated to furnish support for a
certain period after his daughter abandoned her home. It should be
remembered that the daughter moved off campus, sold her car, lived
with friends during her summer vacation and brought suit in the family court. Moreover, she secured an order requiring her father to pay for
the pending fall college term and to provide all reasonable medical
expenses, and also obtained a subsequent order directing payment of
$250 per month. Both appellate courts upheld the first order and
reversed the second, $250 per month order. However, as these courts
indicated, the actions of the daughter in moving off campus and failing
to return to her father's home caused her to forfeit all right to support.
Yet, it is curious to note that although the daughter took these actions
prior to the pending fall college term and, thus, presumably, at this
point in time forfeited all future support rights, the father was ultimately held liable for the expenses of the forthcoming term. It would
appear more consistent for the appellate courts to have held that since
449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Herbert v. Herbert, 198 Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Doam. Rel.
Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Esteb v. Esteb, 188 Wash. 174, 244 P.264 (1926).
32 259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966).
3 The daughter's natural mother died when she was only three years old. In a
certain sense it can be said, although the family court does not mention it, that the family
unit of natural father, mother and child had, in fact, been disrupted by the death of
the natural mother.
84 29 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
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the daughter forfeited all support rights prior to the start of the school
year in September, 1970, the father was not obligated to pay the
expenses of that term.
Although we have thus far exclusively focused upon the obligations of a parent to his off-spring, under the common law35 it was clear
that minors were subject to their parents' directions and were required
to be obedient during their minority and to honor and revere their
parents thereafter.36 Under more recent case law, children are obligated
to observe any reasonable regulation that parents may impose.31 In
addition, it has also been held that in return for their support obligations, parents are rightly entitled to the companionship and custody
of their children.38 In the instant case the Court of Appeals did not
take issue with such precedent and reaffirmed the reciprocal obligations
of minor children to their parents.3 9
Customarily, in the area of a third-party volunteer supplying necessities to a minor, the law is well settled, that it is irrelevant how derelict
a father may have been in meeting his parental obligations, he is under
no legal obligation, in the absence of a statutory enactment, to reimburse the volunteer for necessities he may have furnished, unless there
is an express or implied obligation. 40 To allow a third party to intervene in the place of the parent would tend to undermine the parent's
legal authority to correct any act of misconduct by his minor child. 41
The appellate division's decision in the instant case pointed out
that a parent is entitled to set reasonable standards, rules and regulations. 42 This principle was impliedly adopted by the Court of Appeals
by citation to Stant v. Lamberson.43 For Stant held that submission to
reasonable restraints and habits of propriety, obedience and conformity
to domestic discipline are required from the child under the principles
of both natural and civil law.4 Thus, the parent has the right, in the
absence of caprice, misconduct or neglect, to demand of his child
adherence to reasonable standards. 45 In this regard it is the father's
1 W. BLACQ=STONE COIMENTAKIUs 446, supra note 8.
s6 Id.458.
85

87 Haskell v. Haskell, 201 App. Div. 414, 194 N.Y.S. 28 (1st Dep't), aff'd 286 N.Y. 685,

142 N.E. 314 (1923).

88White v. White, 188 Conn. 1, 81 A.2d 450 (1951).

89 29 N.Y.2d at 193, 272 NYE.2d at 570, 324 N.Y.S2d at 74.
40 Gotts v. Clark, 78 Ill. 229 (1875); McMillen v. Lee, 78 Ill.
443 (1875); French v.
Benton, 44 N.H. 28 (1862); Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N.J.L. 383 (1876).
41 In Re Carl, 174 Misc. 985, 22 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1940) (it is a
parent's duty to correct any act of misconduct of his child).

42 86 App. Div. 2d 162, 318 N.Y.S. 975 (1st Dep't 1971).
108 Ind. App. 411, 8 N.E.2d 115 (1937).
Id. at 412, 8 N.E.2d at 117.
45 29 N.Y.2d at 194, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
43
44
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paramount right to supervise the education of his children.46 It is worth
noting that although the prior thrust of the law had been to place the
main emphasis of support on the father, statutes have been adopted
which provide that a married woman is a joint guardian of her children.47 Thus, under such statutes both parents will have equal powers,
rights and obligations with respect to the education of their off-spring.48
In the instant case, a father was relieved of his obligation to support his minor daughter once she abandoned his home and effectively
placed herself beyond his control. However, the implication of this
decision is not precisely clear in a situation in which a minor child has
not abandoned his parents' home and has not placed himself beyond
their effective control, yet, while remaining at home, insists on maintaining his own life-style, or drops out of school or, in general,
refuses to obey his parent's commands. If a parent then terminates
support for this recalcitrant minor by refusing, e.g., to purchase warm
clothing in the winter or to replace worn-out garments, it may be
profitable to speculate on the prospects for judicial action. The Court
of Appeals stressed, as a fundamental principle, that a parent must
support even a delinquent minor child. So, it would appear that as
long as the child remained at home the parent is legally obligated to
support the child, his delinquency notwithstanding. But, if the parent
failed to do so, would a court even entertain a support action? The
Court of Appeals has very strongly stressed its reluctance to become
involved in parent-child disputes which should be resolved by the
parties. In the future, courts may interpret the instant case as a very
strong and clear signal to avoid such family disputes, absent evidence
of a clear and present danger, caused by the parent's dereliction of duty,
to the minor's morals, health or welfare.
In any event, this decision must be viewed as a reaffirmation of
the primacy of parental authority in establishing reasonable standards
which must be obeyed by a child. Additionally, it should serve as notice
to minors chafing under the yoke of parental restrictions, that to
abandon a parent's house is to forfeit any legal right to support and,
quite likely, even to a judicial hearing absent a showing of either
actual or potential injury to the minor's morals or mental or physical
condition.
Griston v. Stousland, 186 Misc. 201, 60 N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. T. Ist Dep't 1946).
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAWS § 81 (McKinney 1964). See Fostr & Fxm-n § 23:3.
Marks v. New York, 101 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1950). Where the father
abandons his family without providing for support the mother has the duty of supporting
her child. Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y..2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Richmond County 1942).
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